



Contents lists available at [Journal ELORA](#)

JRTI (Jurnal Riset Tindakan Indonesia)

ISSN: 2502-079X (Print) ISSN: 2503-1619 (Electronic)

Journal homepage: <https://jrti.eloracenter.org/jrti>



From mandated coordination to public value: a systematic review of collaborative government management

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Article Info

Article history:

Received Jul 18th, 2026
Revised Jul 29th, 2026
Accepted Aug 07th, 2026

Keyword:

Collaborative government management,
Collaborative governance,
Policy integration,
Public value,
Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Indonesia's decentralized government relies on collaboration across ministries, regional agencies, villages, public-service units, businesses, universities, civil-society organizations, and communities. This review analyzes how such coordination is converted into integrated policy, joint implementation, and public value. A PRISMA-aligned search of indexed journal literature published in 2020-2025 identified 74 records; 35 articles remained after duplicate removal, screening, full-text assessment, and index verification. The corpus comprised 26 qualitative case/process studies, four mixed or quantitative studies, and five review, policy, or conceptual articles. Because designs and outcomes were heterogeneous, the study used structured extraction, design-sensitive methodological appraisal, and hybrid deductive-inductive thematic synthesis rather than statistical pooling. The synthesis indicates that collaboration is warranted when authority, knowledge, implementation capacity, and legitimacy are distributed across organizations; hierarchy remains necessary for legal authority, minimum standards, rapid command, and accountability. Five conditions repeatedly distinguish substantive collaboration from ceremonial participation: an authoritative mandate linked to resources, facilitative and boundary-spanning leadership, explicit roles and decision rights, integration of plans-budgets-data-workflows, and accountability for citizen outcomes. The proposed Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle connects problem interdependence, actor architecture, shared intelligence, policy integration, joint delivery, and public-value learning. Its theoretical contribution is to position policy integration as the conversion mechanism between collaborative process and service outcomes, while treating mandated participation, decentralization capacity, power asymmetry, cultural legitimacy, and digital interoperability as contextual conditions.



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Introduction

Indonesia's public problems often combine interdependence with fragmented authority. Stunting, for example, cannot be addressed by a health office alone because nutrition, sanitation, poverty, family planning, education, village administration, community outreach, and household behavior are governed through different organizations and funding streams. The Indonesian evidence reviewed here documents recurrent operational consequences of that fragmentation: inconsistent target data, duplicated activities, weak private-sector participation, unclosed service referrals, ceremonial meetings, and discontinuity after leadership turnover (Amin

et al., 2021; Afandi et al., 2023; Daniel et al., 2023; Lattu & Rahayu, 2024; Wahyuni et al., 2021). Most studies do not quantify the transaction costs or causal effects of these failures, which is itself an important evidence gap. Collaboration is not automatically superior to hierarchy or contracting. Hierarchy is appropriate when legal authority, rapid command, uniform standards, or enforceable accountability dominate the task; market arrangements may be useful when outputs are specifiable and competition is credible. Collaborative government management becomes analytically justified when four conditions coincide: resources and knowledge are distributed, implementation crosses organizational boundaries, unilateral action creates displacement or duplication, and affected groups hold information or legitimacy that government cannot substitute internally. Crisis research likewise shows that hierarchy and collaboration are complementary rather than mutually exclusive: command supplies authority and speed, while collaboration supplies dispersed information, adaptation, and implementation capacity (Parker et al., 2020).

Collaborative governance refers to institutional arrangements through which public agencies and non-state actors jointly formulate or implement public purposes that cannot be achieved separately (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). Recent research has moved beyond listing favorable conditions. Comparative studies identify multiple pathways to performance, emphasize active inclusion management, trace how collaborations evolve or decline, and show that institutional design and hands-on leadership combine configurationally rather than additively (Ansell et al., 2020; Douglas et al., 2020a, 2020b; Torfing et al., 2020; Ulibarri et al., 2020). Research on downstream governance further directs attention to implementation, evaluation, accountability, and policy integration after agreement is reached (Cejudo & Michel, 2021; Sorensen & Torfing, 2021).

These advances expose a distinction between collaboration as interaction and collaboration as management. Meetings, memoranda of understanding, stakeholder forums, and task forces can broaden participation without changing budgets, data systems, workflows, or responsibility. A functioning collaborative management system translates collective deliberation into partner-specific duties, compatible policy instruments, resource commitments, interoperable information, coordinated service pathways, and measurable outcomes. Indonesian stunting, smart-city, disaster, waste, and development cases repeatedly show that stakeholder presence is insufficient when organizational routines remain separate.

The Indonesian context is theoretically consequential rather than merely geographic. Collaboration is frequently mandated from above but implemented through decentralized institutions with uneven fiscal capacity, staffing, digital infrastructure, and political sponsorship. Community cadres, village institutions, local culture, and informal actors can provide knowledge and legitimacy, yet they may also absorb unfunded coordination burdens. The same arrangement can therefore produce formal compliance in one locality and integrated delivery in another. This pattern tests Western-derived frameworks under conditions of vertical-horizontal misalignment and strong variation in local administrative capacity.

Existing Indonesian studies remain fragmented by sector and method. Most are single-case qualitative studies that describe dialogue, trust, leadership, or participation, while fewer examine integration of policy instruments, budgets, data, and workflows or connect collaborative processes to objective citizen outcomes. Urban governments and high-visibility programs are overrepresented, creating a visibility bias: collaboration is most likely to be studied where programs are administratively visible, digitally documented, and publication networks are stronger. Remote, island, border, and low-capacity governments are comparatively absent.

This review therefore asks: (RQ1) under what conditions is collaboration preferable to predominantly hierarchical coordination in Indonesian government; (RQ2) how do collaborative arrangements integrate policies, budgets, data, authority, and administrative routines; (RQ3) through what evidence-supported mechanisms can collaboration contribute to service effectiveness, equity, resilience, and public value; and (RQ4) what contextual risks cause collaboration to remain symbolic, fragmented, or dependent on individual leaders?

The article contributes an evidence-informed Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle. Unlike models that end with consensus or joint decision, the cycle centers policy integration and downstream delivery. It proposes that collaboration creates public value only when problem interdependence is translated through actor architecture and shared intelligence into aligned instruments, funded workflows, accountable implementation, and iterative learning. Mandated participation, decentralization capacity, power asymmetry, cultural legitimacy, digital interoperability, and resource adequacy are treated as boundary conditions rather than background variables.

Method

This study used a systematic literature review reported in alignment with PRISMA 2020 (Page et al., 2021). The review was designed for qualitative theory-building rather than effect-size aggregation because the corpus

combined heterogeneous sectors, case boundaries, research designs, theoretical frameworks, and outcome measures. The unit of synthesis was the reported mechanism or relationship, not the number of positive statements in an article.

The publication window was January 2020–December 2025. It was selected to capture the period in which pandemic response, accelerated digital-service reform, smart-city programs, and nationally mandated stunting convergence made cross-sector collaboration especially visible in Indonesian administration. Earlier international studies were used as theoretical comparators but were not counted in the 35-study Indonesian corpus. The review was not prospectively registered; this is reported as a limitation, and a PRISMA reporting map is provided in Appendix A.

Searches covered Google Scholar, Dimensions/OpenAlex discovery interfaces, Garuda and SINTA journal portals, Crossref-linked metadata, publisher platforms, and backward and forward citation tracing. The reproducible master Boolean string was: ("collaborative governance" OR "collaborative management" OR "cross-sector collaboration" OR "network governance" OR "whole-of-government" OR "tata kelola kolaboratif" OR "kolaborasi lintas sektor") AND (Indonesia OR Indonesian OR "local government" OR pemerintah OR "pemerintah daerah") AND (coordination OR "policy integration" OR implementation OR "public service" OR "smart governance" OR accountability OR "public value"). Portal-specific searches used shorter combinations when query-length limits applied, and citation tracing was used to recover relevant articles that did not use collaboration terminology in the title.

Articles were included when they were peer reviewed; published in a journal during 2020–2025; focused on Indonesia; involved a government institution or public-service mandate; and explicitly analyzed interorganizational coordination, cross-sector participation, policy integration, joint implementation, digital collaboration, accountability, public value, or service outcomes. Proceedings, theses, books, editorials, purely technical system studies, peripheral references to collaboration, unverifiable journal index status, duplicated evidence bases, and studies without an Indonesian government-management outcome were excluded.

The search log contained 74 candidate records. Ten duplicates were removed, leaving 64 titles and abstracts for screening. Twenty-three records were excluded because they were non-journal publications, lacked a government-management focus, or mentioned collaboration only incidentally. Forty-one full texts were assessed. Six were excluded: two proceedings, one article with unverifiable index status, two studies in which collaboration was peripheral, and one duplicated evidence base. The final synthesis contained 35 articles. Figure 1 reports the complete selection sequence and reasons for exclusion.

A structured matrix recorded author and year, sector, setting, level of government, design, actors, theoretical lens, coordination mechanisms, policy-integration dimensions, implementation arrangements, reported outcomes, barriers, and recommendations. Methodological appraisal was design-sensitive. Empirical articles were examined using the MMAT 2018 screening logic and design-relevant domains, while review or conceptual articles were assessed for question clarity, source transparency, synthesis logic, evidentiary fit, and limitation reporting. Consistent with mixed-method appraisal guidance, no common summed score was interpreted as a validity coefficient. Instead, the synthesis distinguished direct outcome evidence, process or mechanism evidence, and conceptual inference, and claims were worded according to the strongest evidence available.

Screening, extraction, and coding were maintained in one consolidated review log. Independent duplicate screening and coding were not performed; therefore Cohen's kappa or another inter-rater statistic is not reported and has not been retrospectively invented. Reliability was supported instead through explicit eligibility rules, a structured matrix, code definitions, separation of direct findings from inference, and cross-case comparison. This single-reviewer architecture remains a limitation. Statistical publication-bias tests were not appropriate for the heterogeneous qualitative corpus; potential bias was assessed through search-source concentration, design distribution, sectoral clustering, geographic visibility, and the underrepresentation of null or failed initiatives.

Analysis used a hybrid codebook. Deductive codes covered system context, drivers, institutional design, leadership, trust, inclusion, shared motivation, capacity for joint action, policy instruments, administrative routines, implementation, accountability, and outcomes. Inductive codes captured mandated collaboration, sectoral ego, vertical-horizontal misalignment, local political sponsorship, community cadres, penta-helix structures, cultural legitimacy, data fragmentation, ad hoc task forces, and uneven local capacity. The six cycle components were defined operationally before final synthesis and are reported in Table 6.

Table 1. Search strategy, eligibility, and reproducibility safeguards

Component	Specification
Review period	Peer-reviewed Indonesian journal articles published from January 2020 to December 2025; earlier international studies used only for theoretical comparison.

Component	Specification
Sources	Google Scholar; Dimensions/OpenAlex discovery; Garuda and SINTA; Crossref-linked metadata; publisher platforms; backward and forward citation tracing.
Master search syntax	("collaborative governance" OR "collaborative management" OR "cross-sector collaboration" OR "network governance" OR "whole-of-government" OR "tata kelola kolaboratif" OR "kolaborasi lintas sektor") AND (Indonesia OR Indonesian OR "local government" OR pemerintah OR "pemerintah daerah") AND (coordination OR "policy integration" OR implementation OR "public service" OR "smart governance" OR accountability OR "public value").
Inclusion	Indonesian setting; government or public-service mandate; peer-reviewed journal; explicit coordination, policy integration, joint implementation, digital collaboration, accountability, public value, or service outcome.
Exclusion	Proceedings, theses, books, editorials, purely technical studies, peripheral collaboration, unverifiable index status, duplicated evidence base, or no Indonesian government-management outcome.
Selection	74 identified; 10 duplicates removed; 64 screened; 23 excluded at title/abstract; 41 full texts assessed; 6 excluded; 35 included.
Appraisal	Design-sensitive MMAT screening logic for empirical studies; transparency and evidentiary-fit criteria for review/conceptual studies; no misleading common total score.
Synthesis	Structured extraction; deductive-inductive thematic coding; cross-sector comparison; direct finding separated from inference; no statistical pooling.
Reliability	Single consolidated review log; no independent duplicate screening, no Cohen's kappa; limitation explicitly reported.
Bias assessment	Search-source, sectoral, design, geographic, and program-visibility biases assessed narratively; statistical publication-bias tests not applicable.




Figure 1. PRISMA-aligned selection of indexed Indonesian government-management studies

Results and Discussions

The 35 included articles were published in 2020 (3), 2021 (10), 2022 (5), 2023 (4), 2024 (5), and 2025 (8). The corpus comprised 26 qualitative case or process studies, four mixed or quantitative studies, and five literature, policy, or conceptual reviews. These numbers describe the available evidence base; they are not a statistical sample from which population prevalence or causal effect sizes can be generalized.

Public health and stunting formed the largest cluster (13 studies), followed by digital and smart government (7), food security, economic development and poverty (6), environment, waste and tourism (5), and disaster or COVID-19 governance (4). Stunting is analytically valuable not because it proves that all complexity requires collaboration, but because it reveals a complete intergovernmental implementation chain: national targets,

regional planning, village action, frontline services, community cadres, household behavior, and outcome monitoring. It therefore exposes where dialogue fails to become integrated administration.

The literature covers Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara, Aceh, and national programs, but urban governments and administratively visible initiatives are overrepresented. Remote districts, Papua, inter-island coordination, routine intergovernmental work, and failed or discontinued collaborations receive less attention. This pattern threatens external validity and also reveals a politics of evidence production: programs with digital records, flagship status, and university access are more likely to become published cases. Outcome evidence is similarly uneven; many articles report participation, perceived improvement, or process quality rather than longitudinal changes in access, equity, service quality, cost, or citizen experience.

Table 2. Profile of the included evidence base

Dimension	Distribution and interpretive implication (n = 35)
Publication year	2020 (3); 2021 (10); 2022 (5); 2023 (4); 2024 (5); 2025 (8).
Primary design	Qualitative case/process (26); mixed or quantitative (4); literature, policy, or conceptual review (5).
Sector clusters	Stunting/public health (13); digital/smart government (7); disaster/COVID-19 (4); environment, waste, tourism (5); food security, economic development, poverty (6).
Evidence use	Most studies support process and mechanism claims; only a minority directly measure citizen or service outcomes. Causal and mediation language is therefore restricted.
Geographic scope	National, provincial, district/city, village and frontline settings, but urban and visible programs dominate; remote and low-capacity settings are underrepresented.
Recurring mechanisms	Mandate; facilitative leadership; role clarity; boundary spanning; integrated policy instruments; shared data; joint delivery; hybrid accountability.
Main limitations	Single-case designs; short time horizons; limited comparison; process-focused outcomes; weak budget and transaction-cost analysis; publication and visibility bias.

Institutional Context: Decentralization and Mandated Collaboration

Across the evidence base, an authoritative mandate is the most common starting condition, but it is neither necessary in every case nor sufficient for performance. Presidential regulations, ministerial programs, regional decrees, emergency rules, and performance targets create authorization and convening power. In stunting, pandemic management, tax administration, and special economic-zone governance, mandates helped assemble actors and define a common policy space (Amin et al., 2021; Arsandi, 2022; Kurnianingsih & Lamidi, 2025). The comparative literature similarly distinguishes external mandate, external incentive, and self-initiation as different starting conditions with different developmental trajectories (Ulibarri et al., 2020).

Mandates, however, do not guarantee substantive collaboration. Several studies describe arrangements in which actors attend meetings but retain separate priorities, data, budgets, and accountability lines. This produces what may be called mandated participation without integrated management. The difference is whether the mandate specifies shared outcomes, decision rights, resource commitments, and implementation routines. A task force that lists many members but does not assign operational ownership can diffuse responsibility rather than create collective capacity.

Coordination Architecture, Leadership, and Role Clarity

Facilitative leadership is the mechanism most consistently associated with converting formal authorization into working relationships, but the international comparison cautions against treating leadership as a universal independent cause. QCA evidence shows that collaboration can reach performance through different configurations: strong incentives combined with either clear institutional design or intensive collaborative processes (Douglas et al., 2020b). Indonesian cases add that leadership must also bridge vertical government, local politics, community institutions, and operational agencies. Bekasi, Surabaya, and Makassar illustrate how convening, mediation, resource mobilization, and culturally legitimate communication can support policy alignment (Arieffiani & Ekowanti, 2024; Lautt & Rahayu, 2024; Setiawan et al., 2024).

Leadership remains vulnerable when collaboration is personalized. Many Indonesian initiatives depend on a mayor, regent, agency head, or a small group of committed officials. Personal sponsorship can accelerate decisions, but it may also prevent institutionalization. When leaders rotate, informal networks, data-sharing habits, and negotiated commitments can disappear. Sustainable collaboration therefore requires boundary-spanning roles embedded in organizational structures, documented procedures, stable secretariats, and performance responsibilities that survive personnel change.

Role clarity is a second recurring requirement. Cross-sector programs often involve actors whose mandates overlap but whose incentives differ. Planning agencies coordinate, sectoral offices execute, village governments mobilize communities, private actors provide resources or technology, universities supply expertise, and civil-society organizations connect vulnerable groups. Collaboration improves when each contribution is translated into tasks, timelines, decision rights, deliverables, and escalation procedures. Ambiguous roles create duplicated activities, unclosed referrals, and gaps between policy formulation and service delivery.

The studies also show that representation is not equivalent to influence. International mixed-method evidence identifies active inclusion management as more important than simply expanding the participant list (Ansell et al., 2020), while experimental evidence elsewhere shows that representation and performance information shape perceived legitimacy. Indonesian community members, informal workers, small businesses, and marginalized groups may be invited but possess less information, time, authority, and bargaining power than government or corporate actors. Waste, child-friendly city, and stunting cases therefore require participation rules that protect meaningful influence over priorities and implementation (Sihaloho & Rusliadi, 2025; Wargadinata, 2025).

Trust, Local Culture, and Power Relations

Trust appears throughout the Indonesian literature, but the synthesis indicates that trust should be treated as an organizational achievement rather than a cultural assumption. Face-to-face dialogue, transparent information, credible commitments, fair procedures, and visible intermediate results gradually reduce uncertainty. Collaboration weakens when actors suspect that meetings are symbolic, data are selectively disclosed, or costs are shifted to weaker partners. Trust therefore develops through repeated performance and procedural reliability.

Local culture and social capital can strengthen collaborative legitimacy. The Sombere-based smart-city case in Makassar demonstrates how local values can make technological governance more inclusive and understandable. Ecotourism studies show that community attachment and local knowledge support sustainable development when communities participate in benefits and decisions. In poverty reduction, the social-connection perspective emphasizes collective responsibility and the importance of local context (Mulyani et al., 2021; Muallidin, 2025; Setiawan et al., 2024).

Yet cultural language can become symbolic if it substitutes for resource allocation or formal accountability. Invoking gotong royong does not resolve unequal authority, inadequate staffing, or incompatible data systems. The managerial implication is to connect social capital with institutional design: participation rules, accessible information, facilitation, recognition of local knowledge, benefit-sharing arrangements, and mechanisms that allow weaker groups to contest decisions.

Policy Integration: Goals, Instruments, Budgets, Workflows, and Data

Policy integration is the pivotal bridge between collaborative dialogue and government performance and is the principal theoretical extension proposed by this review. International frameworks explain starting conditions, institutional design, collaborative dynamics, and capacity for joint action; Indonesian cases show that these conditions do not reach citizens unless they alter the policy mix and administrative system. Six forms of integration recur: cognitive integration of problem definitions; strategic integration of goals; instrumental integration of regulations and programs; fiscal integration of budgets; organizational integration of workflows and authority; and informational integration of data and monitoring. This elaborates Cejudo and Michel's (2021) argument that policy frames, authority, and information preserve interdependence among policy instruments.

Indonesia's vertical governance structure makes policy integration particularly demanding. National government often sets targets and standards, provinces facilitate or supervise, districts and cities organize service delivery, and villages or frontline units interact directly with citizens. The evidence from stunting shows that results improve when national frameworks are translated into local regulations, planning documents, village actions, community-health routines, and shared monitoring. Bekasi's case explicitly links regional policy integration with collaborative governance, while the mandated-setting study in West Java shows that compliance pressure must be balanced with local ownership and implementation capacity (Afandi et al., 2023; Lutt & Rahayu, 2024).

Horizontal integration across regional agencies is equally important. Sectoral offices are assessed through their own programs and budgets, which can encourage sectoral ego and protect organizational boundaries. Collaborative forums may agree on common goals while each office continues to implement separate activities. The solution identified across cases is to embed collaboration into formal planning, budgeting, service standards, data governance, and performance review. Without these links, collaboration exists beside government rather than within government.

Food-security governance in Bone Regency demonstrates the need to coordinate agriculture, food agencies, local administrations, extension services, farmer groups, businesses, and consumers. The core problem is not simply stakeholder presence but the alignment of production support, distribution, consumption, information, and local implementation (Akbar et al., 2022). The national nutritious-food policy presents a similar challenge at larger scale: national consistency must coexist with local supply chains, SMEs, village-owned enterprises, health standards, and diverse administrative capacity (Nugroho et al., 2025).

Budget integration remains underdeveloped in much of the literature. Many studies mention resource limitations but do not analyze how funds are pooled, sequenced, or attributed. In practice, each agency's budget is authorized through separate planning and accountability systems. Collaborative management therefore needs a financing map that identifies partner contributions, shared costs, gaps, and the relationship between national transfers, regional budgets, village funds, grants, CSR, and private investment. Unfunded coordination mandates generate meetings and reporting without implementation power.

Shared data are another integration bottleneck. Data may differ across agencies because of incompatible definitions, collection cycles, geographies, and information systems. Stunting cases illustrate the consequences of inconsistent target lists and measurement practices; digital government studies show that applications can multiply without interoperability. A collaborative data architecture requires common definitions, data ownership rules, quality assurance, access rights, privacy protection, and responsibility for correcting errors. Dashboards are useful only when they reflect agreed workflows and decision rights.

Digital Collaboration and Smart Government

Digitalization is both an enabler and a test of collaboration. ICT-based applications supported service continuity and information access during the pandemic, while smart-city initiatives created platforms for complaints, population administration, monitoring, and urban management (Maulana, 2020; Rachmawati et al., 2021; Wahyuni et al., 2021). Digital systems can reduce transaction costs, improve traceability, and connect dispersed actors. They also make coordination failures more visible because inconsistent data and fragmented responsibilities are embedded in software.

The evidence suggests that successful digital collaboration is socio-technical. Technology must be accompanied by organizational redesign, legal authority, staff capability, maintenance resources, data standards, and channels for citizens who cannot use digital services. Surabaya's digital transformation and Makassar's culturally integrated smart-city model show the importance of aligning platforms with public-service processes and social context (Priowidodo et al., 2024; Setiawan et al., 2024). A technology-first approach risks creating parallel applications that increase reporting, duplicate data entry, and exclude residents with limited connectivity or literacy.

Digital accountability also requires careful design. Shared systems can clarify who acted, when, and on what evidence, but they can also diffuse responsibility across vendors and agencies. Collaborative agreements should therefore identify data controllers, service owners, escalation responsibilities, cybersecurity and privacy safeguards, and procedures for correcting automated or administrative errors. Citizen-centered evaluation should measure whether digital integration reduces repeated document submission, waiting time, and failed referrals rather than counting applications or online transactions alone.

Joint Implementation, Performance, and Accountability

The downstream stage of joint implementation is where many collaborations lose momentum. After a joint decision, partners return to different organizations, supervisors, budgets, procurement rules, and performance indicators. Implementation succeeds when agreements are translated into partner-specific work plans, resources, common service pathways, and regular problem-solving reviews. In public health, community cadres and frontline facilities often operate as boundary spanners who connect households with multiple government programs. Their contribution must be supported with training, information, supervision, and realistic workloads rather than treated as unlimited voluntary capacity.

Disaster and pandemic studies reveal the value of hybrid governance. Urgent situations require hierarchy for legal authority, command, and rapid allocation, while collaboration supplies distributed information, logistics, community compliance, and adaptive problem solving. The Pekanbaru COVID-19 study indicates that collaboration is weakened by limited communication and uneven stakeholder commitment, while disaster-service innovation studies emphasize the need for integrated institutional arrangements (Amin et al., 2021; Herlina et al., 2021; Thahir, 2022). The managerial challenge is not to choose hierarchy or collaboration, but to specify when each mode leads and how they connect.

Public service effectiveness should be measured at multiple levels. Process indicators include inclusion, trust, information sharing, and decision quality. Output indicators include joint plans, integrated data, referral closure,

facilities, regulations, or service products. Outcome indicators include changes in health, access, resilience, waste reduction, income, or service time. Public-value indicators examine fairness, legitimacy, inclusion, and distribution of benefits and burdens. Reliance on process measures can make an active forum appear successful even when citizens experience no improvement.

Several cases report tangible outcomes. Surabaya's Posyandu Prima combines local-government commitment, cadres, health providers, and non-governmental actors in improving public health services. Bekasi links a sharp decline in stunting with multi-level policy integration, facilitative leadership, and community participation. Pemalang's 2025 study reports that collaborative governance contributed to declining stunting prevalence, while the special economic-zone case proposes institutional integration and continuous stakeholder engagement to improve accountability and service delivery (Arieffiani & Ekowanti, 2024; Kurnianingsih & Lamidi, 2025; Lauth & Rahayu, 2024; Permatasari & Prasongko, 2025). These outcomes are encouraging, although causal attribution remains limited by predominantly qualitative designs.

Collaborative performance management must recognize contribution rather than demand unrealistic single-actor attribution. A small set of shared outcome indicators should be combined with partner-specific commitments, milestone evidence, qualitative learning, and citizen feedback. Joint reviews should ask not only whether activities were completed, but whether interorganizational handoffs worked, vulnerable groups benefited, costs were fairly distributed, and the collaboration itself imposed unnecessary administrative burden.

Accountability is necessarily hybrid. Horizontal accountability among partners supports mutual adjustment, transparency, and learning. Vertical accountability preserves statutory responsibility, financial control, auditability, and democratic authorization. Problems arise when shared responsibility is interpreted as no responsibility. Effective arrangements document which organization remains legally accountable, how collective decisions are recorded, how disputes are escalated, and how results are reported to elected institutions and the public.

Cross-Sector Comparison and Recurring Risks

Cross-sector comparison reveals both common mechanisms and sector-specific differences. Stunting and public health require sustained, household-level implementation and integration of social determinants; they therefore depend heavily on cadres, villages, data quality, and continuity over several years. Disaster and pandemic collaboration operate under compressed time and uncertainty, making command-collaboration hybridity central. Digital government depends on interoperability and user capability. Waste and environmental governance require recognition of informal actors, behavioral change, and long-term market arrangements. Tourism and special economic zones involve public-private investment, benefit distribution, and legitimacy. Poverty and food-security programs require coordination between structural policy, local production, social protection, and community agency.

Despite sectoral differences, five mechanisms recur, but they should be interpreted configurationally rather than as a universal checklist:

Recurring risks also cut across sectors. Sectoral ego protects budgets and professional jurisdictions. Power asymmetry allows government or corporate actors to dominate agendas. Symbolic participation creates legitimacy without influence. Data silos block shared diagnosis. Short project cycles undermine trust and institutional learning. Personnel rotation disrupts informal networks. Small organizations and community partners absorb reporting burdens without adequate support. Collaboration can therefore increase transaction costs and weaken accountability unless it is deliberately designed and periodically reviewed.

Table 3. Synthesis matrix of 35 indexed Indonesian studies

Study and setting	Policy/management domain	Main contribution to collaborative government management
Maulana (2020) - Jambi Province	Digital public services	E-government inclusion requires collaboration among government, technology actors and citizens; institutional and capability gaps limit inclusion.
Hidayat et al. (2020) - Jember	Forest-resource governance	Stakeholder analysis shows that authority, interests and local participation must be actively managed rather than assumed.
Ulfah & Nugroho (2020) - Jember	Health development/stunting	Stunting is shaped by interdependent social determinants, supporting integrated local-government intervention.
Amin et al. (2021) - Pekanbaru	COVID-19 response	Collaboration was mobilized rapidly but weakened by communication, participation and commitment gaps.
Essa et al. (2021) - Bandung	Stunting reduction	Handling strategies require coordinated planning, targeted interventions and local institutional capacity.
Mulyani et al. (2021) - ecotourism	Sustainable tourism	Community, government and business collaboration supports sustainability when participation and benefits are credible.

Study and setting	Policy/management domain	Main contribution to collaborative government management
Rachmawati et al. (2021) - Indonesian smart cities	ICT and service continuity	Applications supported pandemic response, but benefits depended on organizational readiness and citizen access.
Wahyuni et al. (2021) - Makassar	Smart governance/population service	Legislation, policy, technology, vision and collaboration were not fully aligned, limiting service effectiveness.
Herlina et al. (2021) - local government	Disaster service innovation	Innovation requires an institutional model connecting local government, communities and supporting actors.
Ipan et al. (2021) - stunting case	Public-health collaboration	Dialogue and commitment matter, but capacity and continuity determine whether coordination reaches households.
Sukanti & Faidati (2021) - Sleman	Stunting reduction	Collaboration operated, yet limited private-sector involvement and communication platforms constrained results.
Erlyn et al. (2021) - local governments	Nutritional intervention	Local-government commitment and integrated nutrition interventions accelerate stunting reduction.
Anggraini & Wula (2021) - North Central Timor	Integrated stunting countermeasures	Border-region performance depends on cross-agency integration, implementation capacity and local adaptation.
Alma'arif & Wargadinata (2022) - Bekasi Regency	Open development planning	Open-government adoption expands participation but requires institutional support and meaningful use of citizen input.
Akbar et al. (2022) - Bone Regency	Food security	Cross-sector collaboration must integrate production, distribution, consumption and local implementation responsibilities.
Thahir (2022) - Banten	Post-disaster social policy	Collaboration was constrained by institutional fragmentation and unequal stakeholder participation.
Arsandi (2022) - Yogyakarta	Tax-revenue optimization	Leadership, interdependence and data matching enabled collaboration between tax and customs institutions.
Utami et al. (2022) - Pekanbaru	Smart living	Smart-city outcomes depend on collaborative process, shared understanding and implementation capacity.
Afandi et al. (2023) - West Java	Mandated stunting collaboration	Top-down mandates mobilize actors but must be balanced with local ownership, resources and institutionalized interaction.
Warsono et al. (2023) - Indonesia	COVID-19 governance and rule of law	Emergency governance exposed tensions among legal authority, collaborative coordination and rights protection.
Lawelai & Nurmandi (2023) - national poverty literature	Poverty reduction	Inclusive solutions require effective communication and coordination among government, private, civic and community actors.
Daniel et al. (2023) - Ende District	Stunting program system	Interactions among program factors show that isolated interventions are insufficient without system-level coordination.
Ariefiani & Ekowanti (2024) - Surabaya	Health-service innovation	Government commitment, cadres and cross-sector partnership supported Prima Posyandu and stunting reduction.
Lautt & Rahayu (2024) - Bekasi City	Regional policy integration/stunting	Facilitative leadership, multi-level policy alignment and community participation formed a sustainable intervention system.
Setiawan et al. (2024) - Makassar	Culturally integrated smart city	Local cultural values strengthened communication, trust and commitment in technology-enabled urban governance.
Siradj & Sudarmono (2024) - Buton	Stunting in Bajau community	Government-level collaboration was effective, but private involvement and community health awareness remained weak.
Priyowidodo et al. (2024) - Surabaya	Digital transformation	Smart government requires organizational transformation and citizen-oriented service integration, not technology alone.
Sabarna & Ramdani (2025) - Yogyakarta	Municipal waste management	Sustainable waste collaboration requires role clarity, community participation and continuity beyond projects.
Sihaloho & Rusliadi (2025) - Medan	Plastic recycling	Integrating informal actors and community participation is essential for inclusive circular-waste governance.
Kurnianingsih & Lamidi (2025) - Bintan	Special economic zone	A unified institutional body, formal coordination and continuing stakeholder forums can improve accountability and service delivery.
Nugroho et al. (2025) - national nutritious-food policy	Food and nutrition policy	A hybrid multi-level architecture must preserve national coherence while adapting supply chains and implementation locally.
Sitorus & Nooraini (2025) - Toba Regency	Smart governance	Leadership support improved SPBE performance, although interdependence and incentives remained incomplete.
Wargadinata (2025) - Depok	Child-friendly city	Multi-level government, business, community and academic participation supported a shared urban child-protection agenda.
Permatasari & Prasongko (2025) - Pematang	Stunting prevention	Collaborative implementation was associated with declining stunting, supported by government-private coordination.

Study and setting	Policy/management domain	Main contribution to collaborative government management
Muallidin (2025) - Sumbawa	Poverty alleviation	Weak inter-institutional coordination and limited community voice constrain poverty programs; collective responsibility and local context strengthen them.

Table 4. Cross-theme synthesis and recommended government practice

Management domain	Enabling mechanisms	Recurring risks	Recommended practice
Mandate and institutional design	Clear legal basis; shared outcomes; decision rights; durable secretariat.	Ceremonial participation; ad hoc task forces; dependence on political sponsorship.	Specify authority, resources and escalation rules; embed collaboration in routine institutions.
Actor architecture	Stakeholder mapping; representative participation; boundary spanners; facilitation.	Dominant actors; missing frontline or community knowledge; role ambiguity.	Protect weaker voices; assign partner-specific tasks and deliverables; fund coordination work.
Policy integration	Aligned plans, instruments, budgets, standards, workflows and vertical levels.	Sectoral ego; conflicting indicators; unfunded mandates; parallel programs.	Map policy mixes and financing; connect forums to planning, budgeting and performance review.
Data and digital infrastructure	Common definitions; interoperability; shared dashboards; privacy and quality rules.	Data silos; repeated entry; vendor dependence; exclusion; unclear ownership.	Establish data governance, service ownership and burden-sensitive multi-channel design.
Joint implementation	Co-production; frontline coordination; closed-loop referrals; adaptive delivery.	Return to silos; weak follow-through; uneven burden; personnel turnover.	Use integrated work plans, milestones, issue logs and regular joint problem-solving reviews.
Performance and accountability	Shared outcomes; contribution evidence; citizen feedback; horizontal and vertical accountability.	Diffuse responsibility; process metrics replacing outcomes; excessive reporting.	Use a small indicator set, explicit legal accountability, public reporting and learning reviews.
Public value and equity	Citizen-centered design; cultural legitimacy; fair benefit and cost distribution.	Symbolic local culture; elite capture; digital and geographic exclusion.	Evaluate citizen journeys, equity, local knowledge and sustainability, not only aggregate outputs.

Table 5. International theory comparison and Indonesian extension

Study	Central proposition/evidence	Relation to Indonesian synthesis	Theoretical implication
Ansell & Gash (2008)	Starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, collaborative process.	Broadly confirmed, but mandated collaboration often produces formal participation without integrated administration.	Add policy integration and local capacity as conversion and boundary conditions.
Emerson et al. (2012)	System context, drivers, collaborative dynamics, capacity for joint action.	Confirmed across sectors; vertical decentralization shapes drivers and capacity.	Specify multi-level administrative integration after joint action.
Bryson et al. (2015)	Cross-sector collaboration requires design, leadership, governance, and outcome accountability.	Confirmed; Indonesian evidence stresses budgets, data, and durable secretariats.	Institutionalization must survive political and personnel turnover.
Douglas et al. (2020a)	Standardized case databank enables cumulative and comparative theory testing.	Highlights weakness of Indonesian single-case evidence and need for comparable coding.	The ICGMC offers a context-specific code structure for future case databases.
Parker et al. (2020)	Crisis collaboration combines adaptation, shared goals, and conflict management.	Pandemic and disaster cases show collaboration complements command authority.	Governance-mode fit should vary by urgency and task interdependence.
Sorensen et al. (2020)	Political boundary spanning links collaborative arenas with representative democracy.	Local political sponsorship matters but can personalize and destabilize collaboration.	Separate political sponsorship from durable administrative boundary spanning.

Study	Central proposition/evidence	Relation to Indonesian synthesis	Theoretical implication
Ansell et al. (2020)	Active inclusion management matters more than participant presence alone.	Confirmed in community, informal-sector, and vulnerable-group participation.	Participation must be assessed through influence, resources, and decision rights.
Torring et al. (2020)	Institutional design and hands-on leadership combine to support collaborative innovation.	Confirmed; technology-first reforms fail without rules, leadership, and service redesign.	Digital collaboration is socio-technical and configurational.
Ulibarri et al. (2020)	Collaborations evolve, reorient, stabilize, decline, or terminate over time.	Indonesian studies rarely observe leadership transitions or long-term decline.	Add institutional memory and feedback as central cycle requirements.
Douglas et al. (2020b)	Different combinations of incentives, design, and process lead to performance.	Supports avoiding a universal checklist; local capacity changes viable pathways.	The ICGMC is a diagnostic sequence, not a claim that all components have equal effects.
Waardenburg et al. (2020)	Collaboration contains persistent practical paradoxes and trade-offs.	Sectoral ego, power asymmetry, symbolic participation, and reporting burden recur.	Treat contradictions as design problems rather than implementation anomalies.
Cejudo & Michel (2021)	Policy frame, authority, and information bind integrated policy mixes.	Strongly confirmed by planning, budget, data, and workflow fragmentation.	Policy integration is the conversion mechanism between collaboration and service outcomes.
Sorensen & Torring (2021)	Downstream implementation, evaluation, and accountability are underdeveloped.	Confirmed; Indonesian forums often weaken after decisions are made.	Move joint delivery and public-value learning into the core model.
Cristofoli et al. (2022)	Collaborative governance faces tensions between effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability.	Hybrid horizontal and vertical accountability is necessary in decentralized government.	Shared responsibility must not erase statutory responsibility.
Qi & Ran (2024)	Paradoxes are inherent across collaborative principles and practices.	Mandate-versus-ownership, inclusion-versus-power, and digital access-versus-exclusion are visible.	Contextual moderators should be modeled as recurring tensions, not residual variables.

The comparison demonstrates both convergence and extension. Indonesian evidence confirms the importance of incentives, institutional design, facilitative leadership, inclusion management, and adaptive collaboration. It extends this literature by showing that mandated collaboration is common but easily ceremonial; that policy integration is the critical downstream conversion mechanism; and that decentralization capacity, community cadres, local culture, digital interoperability, and uneven resources shape which collaborative pathway is viable. The model therefore does not claim Indonesian exceptionalism; it specifies how general mechanisms are conditioned in a decentralized, vertically steered, and locally heterogeneous administrative system.

Integrated Framework and Propositions

The synthesis supports an evidence-informed Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle (ICGMC), presented in Figure 2. The framework is a theoretical proposition derived from recurring mechanisms and contradictions in the 35-study corpus; it is not a statistically validated causal model.




Figure 2. Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle (ICGMC)

The framework is cyclical rather than linear. New evidence may change the problem definition, reveal missing stakeholders, require instrument redesign, or shift resources. Feedback is especially important in Indonesia because national programs interact with diverse local contexts. Standardization is necessary for rights, data, and minimum service quality, but local adaptation is necessary for geography, culture, institutional capacity, and community needs. Collaborative management must therefore combine common outcomes and safeguards with bounded local discretion.

Five testable propositions follow. P1: mandates accelerate mobilization, but service outcomes improve only when authority, resources, and operational ownership are specified. P2: facilitative leadership is more sustainable when political sponsorship is complemented by institutionalized boundary-spanning roles and routines. P3: policy integration mediates the conversion of collaborative process into service outcomes; participation without aligned instruments, budgets, data, and workflows will have weak downstream effects. P4: local culture and social capital strengthen legitimacy only when participation is procedurally fair and linked to formal accountability. P5: digital collaboration creates net public value when interoperability and service simplification exceed new reporting burdens, privacy risks, and exclusion.

Table 6. Operational definitions for the Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle

Component	Operational definition	Observable evidence in primary studies
Problem and mandate	Documented interdependence plus legal, political, or program authority to convene action.	Shared problem statement; formal mandate or incentive; stated collective outcome; limits of unilateral authority.
Actor architecture	Selection and structuring of actors, representation, roles, decision rights, and boundary-spanning functions.	Stakeholder map; role matrix; participation rules; facilitation; representation of frontline and affected groups.
Shared intelligence	Joint problem framing and usable integration of administrative data, professional knowledge, and local experience.	Common definitions; data-sharing rules; joint analysis; transparent evidence; documented learning.
Policy integration	Alignment of goals, regulations, instruments, budgets, standards, workflows, and accountability lines.	Integrated plans and budgets; compatible indicators; assigned authority; interoperable processes; financing map.
Joint implementation	Translation of agreements into coordinated work, referrals, services, resource use, and adaptive problem solving.	Partner work plans; closed-loop referrals; milestone tracking; issue logs; frontline coordination.
Public-value learning	Assessment of outcomes, equity, legitimacy, accountability, burden, and sustainability, with feedback to earlier stages.	Citizen outcomes and feedback; distributional analysis; public reporting; corrective action; institutional memory.

For public managers, the framework provides a diagnostic sequence rather than a prescription to create more forums. Managers should first test whether the problem truly requires cross-boundary collaboration or can be resolved through clearer hierarchy, contracting, or routine interagency coordination. When collaboration is warranted, they should map mandates, actors, policy instruments, budgets, data systems, citizen journeys, and

failure points; specify shared outcomes, decision rules, responsibilities, participation safeguards, and escalation mechanisms; integrate work plans and financing; maintain boundary-spanning capacity; and evaluate citizen outcomes, equity, accountability, sustainability, and the administrative cost of collaboration itself.

Conclusions

This review finds that collaborative government management in Indonesia is most defensible when public problems combine distributed authority, knowledge, implementation capacity, and legitimacy. Collaboration is not a default substitute for hierarchy. Formal authority remains essential for legality, minimum standards, rapid command, and vertical accountability; collaboration becomes valuable when implementation and knowledge must cross those authoritative boundaries. Across 35 indexed articles, the recurring weakness was not absence of stakeholder forums but failure to convert interaction into integrated policy and delivery.

The theoretical contribution of the Indonesian Collaborative Government Management Cycle is threefold. First, it relocates policy integration from the background of collaborative-governance models to the central conversion mechanism between process and public-service outcomes. Second, it extends downstream scholarship by connecting joint implementation to public-value learning, so evaluation, equity, accountability, administrative burden, and adaptation feed back into problem definition and institutional design. Third, it specifies context-dependent tensions that shape viable pathways in Indonesia: mandate versus local ownership, political sponsorship versus institutional continuity, inclusion versus power asymmetry, national standardization versus local adaptation, and digital traceability versus fragmentation and exclusion. These extensions are evidence-informed propositions, not a statistically validated causal model.

The evidence supports several cautious conclusions. Mandates can mobilize actors but often remain ceremonial without resources and decision rights. Facilitative leadership matters, but its effects are fragile when boundary-spanning work is personalized. Community networks and local culture can strengthen legitimacy, but they cannot substitute for budgets, staff, data governance, or fair procedures. Digital platforms can improve traceability and access, but they can also reproduce silos and administrative burdens. Collaboration therefore performs through configurations of authority, design, leadership, integration, and accountability rather than through any single universally sufficient condition.

The review is limited by a single consolidated screening and coding log, the absence of inter-rater reliability statistics, lack of prospective registration, heterogeneous appraisal across study designs, dominance of qualitative single-case research, uneven geographic coverage, and limited longitudinal or citizen-level outcomes. No Cohen's kappa or common quality score is reported because such statistics were not produced and should not be reconstructed retrospectively. Future research should use duplicate screening, publish codebooks and extraction matrices, compare similar policies across high- and low-capacity regions, observe collaborations through leadership transitions, measure transaction and administrative costs, and link network conditions to objective service and equity outcomes. For practice, the implication is direct: do not measure collaboration by the number of actors or meetings; assess whether it changes authority, policy instruments, financing, data, workflows, accountability, and citizen experience.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the scholars whose indexed publications formed the evidence base for this systematic review. This manuscript was prepared as an academic contribution to Indonesian government-management scholarship. No external funding was received.

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